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THE FAILURE OF THE DUE PROCESS DEFENSE IN UNITED
STATES V. GAMBLE
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. GambleI the defendant was randomly targeted in
an undercover scheme conceived and contrived by United States postal
inspectors.2 Upon appeal of his conviction, the defendant raised the de-
fense of outrageous governmental conduct: the due process defense.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the government's conduct
was not so outrageous as to shock the conscience of the court.3 The
case is unremarkable insofar as Dr. Gamble's defense failed; the defense
has been successful only once in the federal courts - in the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals' 1978 decision in United States v. Twigg.4 Gamble is,
however, an excellent example of police undercover work which focuses
on anticipating rather than investigating crime and of the federal courts'
failure to adjust due process analysis when faced with such tactics.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Entrapment and the Development of the Due Process Defense
In Sorrells v. United States,5 the Supreme Court for the first time rec-
ognized entrapment 6 as a valid defense to criminal charges. 7 ChiefJus-
tice Hughes, writing for the majority, based the Court's finding for the
defendant on three factors: (1) the conduct of the government in insti-
gating the crime;8 (2) the purpose of the statute? and (3) the predisposi-
tion of the defendant.' 0 The Court reasoned that a nonpredisposed
defendant cannot be guilty of committing an offense which was created
1. 737 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1984).
2. The undercover operation was dubbed "MAIL-Fraud" for Medical and Insurance
Fraud, discussed infra, notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
3. The 'shocks-the-conscience' standard, as it has come to be called, is that an-
nounced in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), discussed infra, text accompany-
ing notes 25-35.
4. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), discussed infra, text accompanying notes 49-56.
5. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
6. The lower federal courts had already recognized the entrapment defense. See, e.g.,
Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
7. In Sorrells, the defendant was twice approached by a prohibition agent to purchase
whiskey for him. Sorrells finally capitulated after repeated appeals to sympathy and friend-
ship. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 439. At trial, no evidence was produced showing that the de-
fendant had ever bought, sold, or possessed alcoholic beverages prior to the event in
question. Id. at 441.
8. Although acknowledging that the government may use "[a]rtifice and stratagem"
to ferret out crime, "[a] different question is presented when the criminal design
originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an inno-
cent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in
order that they may prosecute." Id. at 441-42.
9. The majority found that Congress could not have intended that enforcement of its
laws was to be achieved by inducing innocent victims to commit the offense. Id. at 448.
10. ld. at 451.
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and instigated by the government for its subsequent prosecution. The
controlling question in any court's inquiry, the majority stated, is
whether an "otherwise innocent" individual was entrapped solely be-
cause of the government's "creative activity."'I 1
Finding the Court's reasoning fallacious, Justice Roberts, concur-
ring in the result, contended that the sole issue was the government's
conduct, regardless of the statutory construction1 2 and regardless of the
defendant's predisposition.13 The reason for the defense, argued Jus-
tice Roberts, lies in "the public policy which protects the purity of gov-
ernment and its processes."14
The majority and concurring opinions thus respectively expressed
the "subjective" and "objective" theories of entrapment. Both agreed
that a defendant ensnared by improper governmental conduct could not
be prosecuted and convicted for the offense. But while the proponents
of the subjective theory would examine the government's conduct in
light of the defendant's predisposition and dismiss the prosecution only
upon a finding that the defendant would not have committed the act but
for the government's enticement, those adhering to the objective theory
would view the defendant's predisposition as irrelevant and would dis-
miss the case whenever the government employed illegal, improper, or
impermissible strategies in order to prosecute and convict a defendant.
Further developing the subjective standard espoused in Sorrells, the
Court in Sherman v. United States 15 stated that the entrapment issue turns
on whether the trap ensnares the "unwary innocent" or the "unwary
criminal"1 6 - that is, the individual predisposed to commit the crime.
In Sherman, a government informant who, along with the defendant
Sherman, was undergoing treatment for heroin addiction, repeatedly
pressed Sherman to supply him with narcotics because he was in pain
and not responding to treatment. The defendant succumbed to these
appeals and was subsequently indicted and convicted. The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction, finding that the defendant had estab-
lished entrapment as a matter of law.'
7
The Court thus rejected the government's argument that the de-
l1. Id.
12. Joined by justices Brandeis and Stone, Justice Roberts castigated the majority for
its finding of an "unspoken and implied mandate" in any given statute that a person can be
found not guilty because of the government's conduct. Id. at 456 (Roberts,J., concurring).
The statutory construction theory has been abandoned by the courts. Abramson &
Lindeman, Entrapment and Due Process in the Federal Courts, 8 AM. J. CRIM. L. 139, 158 n.67.
(1980).
13. "To say that such conduct by an official of government is condoned and rendered
innocuous by the fact that the defendant had a bad reputation or had previously trans-
gressed is wholly to disregard the reason for refusing the processes of the court to con-
summate an abhorent transaction." Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 455.
15. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). Chief Justice Warren wrote the majority opinion. Justices
Frankfurter, Douglas, Harlan and Brennan concurred in the result, but would have based
the opinion on the objective theory of entrapment as expressed by Justice Roberts in
Sorrells.
16. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
17. Id. at 370-72.
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fendant was predisposed' s and found the government's actions,
through its informant, highly improper because they "play[ed] on the
weaknesses of an innocent party and beguile[d] him into committing
crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted. Law enforcement
does not require methods such as this."' 19 The concurring Justices
20
expressed their concern for the majority's lack of forthright analysis.
They argued that, although ostensibly adhering to the subjective theory
of entrapment, the Court's holding was nonetheless based on "the con-
duct of the informer ... and not [on the fact that] the Government has
failed to draw a convincing picture of petitioner's [predisposition]."'
'
2
When the Court again considered the entrapment defense in United
States v. Russell2 2 and Hampton v. United States,23 the tension between the
subjective and objective theories of entrapment was apparent in the cre-
ation of the new, constitutionally-based due process defense. 24 Russell
presented the Supreme Court with its first case on the due process de-
fense. The defendant had been convicted of manufacturing, possessing,
and selling methamphetamine (speed).2 5 Because he was predisposed,
Russell was foreclosed from basing his defense on entrapment. 26 He
argued instead that the informant had supplied the defendants with an
essential component of the drug,2 7 and that without the government's
intervention, the component could not have been obtained nor the drug
manufactured. Thus, although predisposed, his conviction could not
stand because of the level of governmental involvement in the crime for
which he was prosecuted. He therefore requested that the Court base
the entrapment defense on constitutional grounds. 28 He analogized his
case to the Court's holdings in Mapp v. Ohio29 and Miranda v. Arizona
3 0
18. The government attempted to prove Sherman's predisposition on the basis of sev-
eral drug sales, id. at 374; his acquiesence to the scheme, id. at 375; and on the basis of
prior narcotics convictions, id. The Court rejected this evidence as "insufficient ... partic-
ularly when we must assume from the record he was trying to overcome the narcotics habit
at the time." Id. at 375-76.
19. Id. at 376.
20. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Douglas, Harlan and Brennan.
21. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter de-
fended the objective theory and called for clear analytical standards defining the defense
and the boundaries of permissible law enforcement practices. Id. at 380-85 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). For an indepth discussion of the subjective and objective theories of en-
trapment, see Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163 (1976) and Note,
Entrapment as a Due Process Defense. Developments After Hampton v. United States, 57 IND. L.J.
89, 89-101 (1982).
22. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
23. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
24. Entrapment is "not of a constitutional dimension." Russell, 411 U.S. at 433.
25. Id. at 424.
26. The informant had infiltrated the existing drug manufacturing ring of Russell and
two other defendants. Id. at 425.
27. Id. at 425-26. The ingredient supplied was phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P).
28. Id. at 430. Russell also argued for the objective theory of entrapment to be
adopted by the Court. Id. at 432-33. The Court declined to do so and reaffirmed its hold-
ings in Sorrells and Sherman. Id. at 433-34.
29. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (illegal search and seizure, fourth amendment).
30. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (self-incrimination clause, fifth amendment).
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in which the Court developed the exclusionary rule as the remedial mea-
sure for illegal searches and seizures and coerced confessions.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, declined to raise the en-
trapment defense to constitutional status. He found the analogy to
Mapp and Miranda inapposite because the exclusionary rule was devel-
oped in those cases as the result of the government's illegal conduct
which violated the defendants' fourth and fifth amendment rights. Rus-
sell's case was different, he stated, because "the Government's conduct
here violated no independent constitutional right of the [defendant]."'3
Furthermore, in Russell, the informant had broken no laws, breached no
rules, nor committed any crimes in its infiltration of the drug manufac-
turing ring.32 Justice Rehnquist then delivered the celebrated dictum
that has become the standard for due process analysis:
While we may some day be presented with a situation in which
the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that
due process principles would absolutely bar the government
from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, cf.
Rochin v. California [citation omitted], the instant case is dis-
tinctly not of that breed... .The law enforcement conduct here
stops far short of violating that "fundamental fairness, shocking
to the universal sense ofjustice," mandated by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
3 3
The Russell opinion thus failed to set guidelines for impermissible
law enforcement practices, merely stating that they must rise to the level
of "outrageous" or "shocking" to the conscience.
Because Russell concerned a drug manufacturing ring, "a continu-
ing, . . . illegal, business enterprise, ' ' 34 the government was allowed
some participation in the enterprise in order to secure convictions. The
Court further cautioned that "the defense of entrapment ... was not
intended to give the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law
enforcement practices of which it [does] not approve."'3 5 Thus, to attain
the status of a due process violation warranting dismissal, law enforce-
ment techniques must be demonstrably egregious. The circumstances
considered by the Court in deciding this issue were the means available
31. Russell, 411 U.S. at 430. See Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV.
55, 248 n.45 (1973) ("In using the expression 'independent constitutional right,' Justice
Rehnquist was apparently referring to any constitutional right not derived from the due
process clause.").
32. Russell, 411 U.S. at 430-31. The Court also stated that the drug was not impossi-
ble to obtain. Id. at 431.
33. Id. at 431-32 (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246
(1960)). The use of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), as the touchstone for due
process violations has caused confusion in determining the boundaries of the defense. See
infra note 59 and accompanying text. In Rochin, the police illegally entered the defendant's
house and, when he swallowed two capsules lying on his nightstand, forcibly attempted to
remove them from his mouth. Unable to remove the capsules, the police handcuffed him,
took him to the hospital and, without consent, forcibly pumped his stomach to examine
the contents for contraband. The vomited material was the evidence used to secure his
conviction. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166.
34. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432.
35. Id. at 435.
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to the authorities to combat the crime and the government's level of
involvement in that crime. Three years later, the focus of analysis
shifted.
Relying on the dictum in Russell, the defendant in Hampton v. United
States3 6 claimed a violation of due process principles of fundamental
fairness through governmental involvement in a crime instigated and di-
rected by the government. He argued that his conviction for narcotics
sales should be overturned because the government both supplied him
with the drug and then purchased it from him.3 7
The Court split into factions when the plurality38 attempted to es-
tablish a per se rule that the remedy for a predisposed defendant "lies
solely in the defense of entrapment" 39 and that due process is violated
"only when the Government activity in question violates some protected
right of the defendant."' The plurality thus determined that predisposi-
tion is always the crucial issue whether the defense rests on entrapment
or due process grounds: a predisposed defendant can have no claim
against the government for its practices short of violence against the
person, in the manner of Rochin.
Justice Powell rejected the plurality's per se rule because he did not
find that the subjective theory of entrapment had encroached upon due
process principles to the point of making predisposition the sole, deter-
minative issue.4 1 Although emphasizing that cases in which "proof of
predisposition is not dispositive will be rare,"' 42 he did not foreclose reli-
ance on either due process or the Court's supervisory powers to warrant
dismissal of the prosecution.
4 3
Justice Powell further recognized that the due process defense as
thus far developed had only dealt with contraband cases and that the
Court had not considered criteria for impermissible governmental con-
duct outside that particular realm. 44 And even within the realm of con-
traband offenses, he noted that the plurality's focus on predisposition
and concomitant per se rule left many unanswered questions. For exam-
36. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
37. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488. The dissent characterized the case as one in which
"[tihe Government is doing nothing less than buying contraband from itself through an
intermediary and jailing the intermediary." Id. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. Justice Rehnquist delivered the plurality opinion, joined by ChiefJustice Burger
and Justice White. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Blackmun.
Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented. Justice Stevens did not participate.
39. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added). This means, of course, that a predis-
posed defendant has no defense because a finding of predisposition precludes the entrap-
ment defense.
40. Id. (emphasis by the Court). The basis forJustice Rehnquist's unnecessarily crab-
bed interpretation of the due process clause apparently lies in his distaste for the remedy
engendered by that defense: "If the police engage in illegal activity in concert with a de-
fendant beyond the scope of their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally culpa-
ble defendant, but in prosecuting the police under the applicable provisions of state or
federal laws." Id.
41. Id. at 492-93 & n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 495 n.7.
43. Id. at 494 nn. 5 & 6, 495.
44. Id. at 493.
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pie, "varying degrees of criminal involvement" engender varying types
of investigative procedures, "and under the flat rule enunciated . . . by
the plurality the differences between the circumstances would be irrele-
vant despite the most outrageous conduct conceivable by the Govern-
ment agents relative to the circumstances."
4 5
In Hampton, five justices indicated that some investigative practices
may warrant dismissal on either supervisory power or constitutional
grounds. At present, at least five members of the Court 46 may be willing
to assess due process claims in light of all circumstances involved.
B. Assessment of the Supreme Court's Holdings
Sorrells, Sherman, Russell, and Hampton make up the Supreme Court's
effort to articulate standards for the entrapment and due process de-
fenses. Although the entrapment defense clearly is based upon the sub-
jective theory of the defendant's predisposition, the basis for the due
process defense remains blurred. The Hampton plurality made a strong
attempt to separate the defense from the objective theory of entrapment
by its retreat from the Russell dictum and by use of the "independent
right" language in its Hampton opinion. Moreoever, because in both
Russell and Hampton the defendants were predisposed, the Court never
examined governmental conduct absent predisposition. Thus, the fol-
lowing issues were never evaluated by the Court: (1) what factors are to
be used to determine governmental overreaching or overinvolvement in
crime; (2) what weight is to be given any factor; and (3) what level must
these factors attain before a deprivation of due process occurs sufficient
to dismiss the prosecution. One may infer from the Court's subsequent
analyses of Sorrells and Sherman in the due process context that while the
government may not instigate the crime, the mere affording of an op-
portunity is not impermissible government conduct. 4 7 The line between
instigation and affording an opportunity is tenuous at best, and the
Court has made no effort to define it.
4 8
45. Id. at 494 n.5. He offered as an example the difference between a "high-school
youth whose 'pushing' is limited to a few ... classmates" and the "hardcore professional,
in the 'business' on a large scale." Id.
46. In Hampton, the dissenters charged that law enforcement interests were not pro-
moted when the government supplied the defendant with contraband and then provided
him with a buyer: "plainly [such conduct] is not designed to discover ongoing drug traf-
fic." Hampton, 425 U.S. at 498 (Brennanj., dissenting). One of the dissenters, Justice
Stewart, has since been replaced by Justice O'Connor. As one commentator points out,
the views of neither Justice O'Connor nor Justice Stevens (who did not participate in
Hampton) are known regarding the due process defense. Mascolo, Due Process, Fundamental
Fairness, and Conduct That Shocks the Conscience: The Right Not to be Enticed or Induced to Crime by
Government and its Agents, 7 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 1, 42 (1984).
47. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489. Although noting the differences between the de-
fendant's and the government's testimony as to who initiated the scheme, the Hampton
Court never addressed the issue of instigation as it applied to the due process defense.
48. Compare Russell, 411 U.S. at 436 (entrapment) (the defendant "was an active par-
ticipant in an illegal drug manufacturing enterprise which began before the Government
agent appeared on the scene, and continued after the Government agent had left the
scene") with Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489-90 (due process) (where defendant was drawn into
scheme by the government, supplied with the contraband and the buyer, the plurality
[Vol. 63:2
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C. The Due Process Defense in the Federal Courts of Appeals
1. The Twigg Decision
United States v. Twigg4 9 represents the only successful due process
defense in the federal courts. 50 The case involved a drug manufacturing
operation set up by a government informant. Defendant Neville was in
charge of raising funds and the informant was in charge of manufactur-
ing. Defendant Twigg was brought into the scheme by Neville. The
planning stages took approximately six months and the drug manufac-
turing ring operated for only one week, under the guidance and exper-
tise of the informant. The defendants were arrested at the end of their
week's labor.
5 1
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found the level of governmen-
tal involvement sufficient to bar prosecution as a violation of due pro-
cess. 52 The court distinguished Hampton from Twigg by finding that
drug sales (as in Hampton) might "require more extreme methods of in-
vestigation" 5 3 than infiltration of a drug manufacturing ring. More im-
portant, however, the court found that in Twigg the entire scheme was
"conceived and contrived by the government agents." 54 The court de-
termined that the rule left by Hampton is that predisposition is not deter-
minative and that fundamental fairness precludes conviction when
police conduct is "outrageous." ' 55 Although noting that defining outra-
geous conduct is difficult at best, the Twigg court concluded that when
the government designs the scheme, provides the expertise, and the de-
fendants do not encourage the scheme but are merely receptive to it,
due process demands dismissal. 56
2. Federal Court Decisions Since Twigg
Since the 1978 Twigg decision, the due process defense has not
been successful in the federal appellate courts, due, in part, to the ques-
tions surrounding the nature of the defense itself. That is, does the de-
stated that "petitioner's case is different from Russell's but the difference is one of degree,
not of kind .... [11n each case the Government agents were acting in concert with the
defendant .... ).
49. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
50. Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) is sometimes cited as a
successful due process defense case, but the Greene court did not analyze it as such. Greene
was cited by the defendant in Russell as an example of extreme governmental overinvolve-
ment. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 428. It is apparent from the Greene opinion that the defend-
ants were small-time operators who were goaded into a large-scale operation by the
government, which also created the only market for the contraband. Greene, 454 F.2d at
784-86.
51. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 375-76. For a thorough analysis of Twigg, see Comment, Due
Process Defense When Government Agents Instigate and Abet Crime, 67 GEo. L.J. 1455 (1979).
52. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 377.
53. Id. at 378.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 379.
56. Id. at 380-81. In a sharp dissent, Judge Adams criticized the majority for resur-
recting the objective theory of entrapment "under a new name." Id. at 383 (Adams, J.,
dissenting).
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fense apply only when enforcement practices have encroached upon
some protected, "independent" right of the defendant and thus violated
due process?57 Or is it a limitation on government investigations,
grounded in due process principles of fundamental fairness? 58 Because
of the dictum in Russell and the lack of a majority view in Hampton, the
answer to these questions is by no means clear. The federal courts have
therefore fashioned various tests to examine claims of due process
violations.
59
Although both the Fifth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals still
consider Twigg an example of outrageous conduct,60 the continued effi-
cacy of that case may be in question. 6 ' Still, some courts are expressing
concern about overzealous and questionable tactics used by various gov-
ernmental agencies, 62 although the case has not yet arisen which is suffi-
cient to shock a court's conscience.
57. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
58. One commentator, posing the question similarly, concludes that "the protection
of due process, with its comprehensive guarantee of fairness in the relations between gov-
ernment and citizen, is not dependent upon any violation, by police misconduct, of a sepa-
rate right of the defendant." Mascolo, supra note 46, at 36.
Many commentators have urged the Court to establish a constitutional basis for con-
trolling undercover investigations. See Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking,
53 TEX. L. REV. 203 (1975) (calling for uniform standards in undercover work based upon
protections inherent in the fourth amendment); Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked Consciences,
and the Staged Arrest, 66 MINN. L. REV. 567, 611 (1982) (proposing a two-tiered due process
analysis focusing on ends and means which requires the government to justify procedures
used); Note, supra note 21, at 122 ("[T]he defense is clearly and most logically required as
a matter of substantive due process: the criminalization of acts which would not have oc-
curred absent the government's solicitation and aid can serve no legitimate purpose.").
But see Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 274 (1976) ("Governmental
bodies with the power to investigate [enforcement practices], subpoena witnesses, publi-
cize abuses, recommend discipline, and institute prosecution are likely to be more effective
than attempts at control through sporadic acquittal of criminal defendants.").
59. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1468 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (The
D.C. Circuit, citing the dictum in Russell concerning outrageous governmental conduct, see
supra note 33 and accompanying text, stated "[tihe Second Circuit has read this citation to
indicate that due process will bar a prosecution only if the government's conduct directly
invades some personal right of the defendant."). Compare Archer v. Commissioner of Cor-
rection (Archer I/), 646 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir.) ("[Ilmpermissible police conduct [must be]
inflicted directly upon the defendant."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851 (1981) with United States
v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1981) (relevant to due process inquiry are govern-
ment instigation, government control of the criminal activity, and the "causal relationship
between the challenged ... conduct and the commission of the [defendant's] acts .... ").
For a thorough examination of cases prior to 1980, see generally Abramson & Lindeman,
supra note 12.
60. See United States v. Yater, 756 F.2d 1058, 1065, 1066 n.12 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2683 (1984).
61. In United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S.1106
(1982), the court stated that three of the judges wanted to overrule Twigg: "[U]nless fur-
ther guidance is given [in the area of the due process defense], district courts, in a faithful
attempt to apply Twigg .... will continue to reach results that cannot be reconciled with
the teaching of the Supreme Court in Hampton." Id. at 610 n. 17. But see supra text accom-
panying note 60.
62. See United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11, 13 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Gar-
rett, 716 F.2d 257, 275 n.10 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1910 (1984).
[Vol. 63:2
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II. UNITED STATES v GAMBLE
A. Facts
In 1980, United States postal inspectors in Kansas City, Missouri,
concocted an intricate scheme to discover attorneys and physicians in-
volved in insurance fraud.6 3 The inspectors obtained driver's licenses
using fictitious names, registered nonexistent vehicles under those
names, and then purchased automobile liability insurance for the
vehicles. 64
The postal inspectors, working with the Kansas City Police Depart-
ment, had an officer prepare false accident reports, indicating that each
accident was the cited inspector's fault. The police issued traffic cita-
tions to the inspectors and they subsequently appeared in Kansas City
Municipal Court and pleaded guilty before unsuspecting prosecutors
and judges.
6 5
Two inspectors, posing as husband and wife, visited Dr. Gamble's
office and told him they had been passengers in a one-car accident on
May 6, 1980 and, although uninjured, wanted to obtain some money
from their insurance company.6 6 They visited Dr. Gamble's office on
seven occasions. During each visit the defendant checked the inspec-
tors' weights, blood pressures, and temperatures and charged them ten
to twelve dollars each. 6 7 On the fourth visit, the defendant's assistant
prepared insurance forms and, at the direction of one of the inspectors,
indicated on the form that the inspector had been unable to work for
approximately two months. On their final visit, the inspectors brought
with them a draft from the insurance company for $180, the medical
expense claimed. Dr. Gamble calculated the amount owed him which
the inspectors paid by money order, keeping the draft. 6 8
Two months later, another false accident report was filed and a sec-
ond "husband and wife" undercover team appeared at Dr. Gamble's of-
fice claiming to have been involved in a rear-end collision. The
inspectors told Dr. Gamble they were uninjured but that the driver of
the car that hit them was insured and they wanted to obtain some money
63. The scheme is described in detail in United States v. Warren, 747 F.2d 1339 (10th
Cir. 1984), a case decided four months after United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853 (10th
Cir. 1984). Both defendants, Warren and Gamble, were physicians in Kansas City and
both were targeted (apparently randomly) by United States postal inspectors as part of the
undercover operation "MAIL-Fraud") (Medical And Insurance Liability Fraud). Warren,
747 F.2d at 1340. It does not appear from either the Warren or Gamble decision that the
postal authorities suspected wholesale insurance fraud among doctors and lawyers, but
instead were on what may be termed a fishing expedition.
64. Warren, 747 F.2d at 1340; Gamble, 737 F.2d at 854.
65. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 854.
66. Id. One of the inspectors told Dr. Gamble he had broken his glasses in the acci-
dent but otherwise had suffered no injuries. Id.
67. Id.
68. Dr. Gamble calculated incorrectly. The draft was for $180. The inspectors had
paid $104 and the defendant calculated they owed him $66. The correct amount owed was
$76. Id. Apparently, the medical expenses and the notation on the form regarding leave
from work were to serve as the basis for some later action against either the "driver" of the
vehicle or a claim against the insurance company.
1986]
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through his insurance. 69 The inspectors visited the defendant on five
occasions and were given routine medical examinations on each visit.
After several weeks, the inspectors told Dr. Gamble they had contacted
the insurance company. At a later visit the inspectors gave the defend-
ant an envelope addressed to the insurance company. Dr. Gamble wrote
out a bill, placed it in the envelope and asked the inspectors to handle
it. 70 On December 11, 1980, the inspectors gave the defendant the
$160 draft they had received from the insurance company. They were
reimbursed the $50 they had paid on the prior five visits and then signed
the draft over to Dr. Gamble.
7 '
Dr. Gamble was subsequently arrested and convicted on four
counts of mail fraud.
7 2
B. The Opinion
A three-judge panel 73 for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed Dr. Gamble's conviction, rejecting the defendant's claims that (1)
the requirements of the mail fraud statute7" were not satisfied, and (2)
the Government's conduct was so outrageous as to bar his conviction as
a violation of due process of law.
1. Mail Fraud
Dr. Gamble's appeal was predicated on the fact that he neither de-
vised the scheme to defraud nor mailed any documents. He further con-
tended that the use of the mails was not crucial to the scheme. 7 5 Finally,
he argued that section 1341 was not applicable to him because the gov-
ernment planned the scheme and his was a peripheral role.
76
The court rejected all of the defendant's claims. First, the court
stated that only two elements are required to prove mail fraud: "(1) a
scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing or causing the mailing of a letter
69. Id. at 855. Dr. Gamble told his "patients:"
"You'll just have to play it up. You can't go out there tell that man ah, I wasn't
hurt .... " "You gotta have a back injury and you gotta have a neck injury or
something .... "We have to write it up to that effect and you'll make some money
out of the deal."
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. As with the other inspectors' visits, Dr. Gamble's profit, if any, was minimal.
72. The federal mail fraud statute provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice or attempting to do so, places in any post office... or knowingly causes to
be delivered by mail ... any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
73. Judge Logan wrote the opinion and was joined by Judges Holloway and
Breitenstein.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). See supra note 72.
75. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 855. Dr. Gamble "admitted in tape recorded meetings with
the inspectors that he knew the mails would be used to execute the scheme." Id. at 856.
76. Id.
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or other item for the purpose of executing the scheme." ' 77 As long as
the defendant had the requisite intent to defraud, 78 the scheme need
not be devised by the defendant. 79 Nor is there a requirement for
agreement among the participants similar to that required in the act of
conspiracy.8 °
2. The Due Process Claim
The court began its analysis of the defendant's due process claim by
citing the dictum in Russell and the opinions in Hampton. The court also
discussed Twigg and Greene v. United States,8 1 noting that in both cases the
government instigated, conceived and directed the schemes; provided
essential services and supplies; and, in the case of Greene, was the sole
purchaser of the contraband.
8 2
The court next asserted that the due process defense, like the de-
fense of entrapment, is based upon the principle that " 'courts must be
closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the government's own
agents.' -83 Crucial to this determination is the extent to which the gov-
ernment's actions directly enticed the defendant to commit the crimes
for which he stands accused: "Thus, the more immediate the impact of
the government's conduct upon the particular defendant, the more vig-
orously would be applied Russell's test for constitutional impropriety."
8 4
The government's conduct, moreover, must be assessed in light of the
defendant's predisposition. The determination of whether governmen-
tal conduct exceeds permissible levels depends upon "the type of op-
portunity to become involved with crime that this conduct provides to
the unwitting defendant."'8 5 The court stated that Dr. Gamble had no
criminal record and the government had no apparent suspicion that he
was predisposed to criminal acts. However, the court stated that such
77. Id. at 855 (citing Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954)).
78. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 856. See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 847 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982).
79. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 856. See United States v. Toney, 598 F.2d 1349, 1356 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1033 (1980).
80. "[Miail fraud, unlike conspiracy, does not require an agreement. Thus, the fact
that only one of the participants ... had a specific intent to defraud does not bar convic-
tion . . . ." Gamble, 737 F.2d at 856. Here, the court concluded that the evidence estab-
lished that Dr. Gamble had the requisite intent to defraud. The fact that it was the
government that engendered and carried out the scheme is not fatal to the issue of the
defendant's intent. Id.
81. 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). See supra note 50.
82. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 857.
83. Id. (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 459 (1932) (Roberts, J., con-
curring)). Why entrapment was not pleaded in Gamble is unclear. The court acknowledged
the defendant's lack of predisposition and absence of a criminal record. Gamble, 737 F.2d
at 859.
84. Id. at 858 (quoting United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146, 150 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975)). In Spivey the court found that the informant's conduct was
not outrageous because the defendant was predisposed and engaged in illegal conduct
without the government's assistance: "We cannot accept defendant's argument [that his
conduct] may be rationalized only by predicating a pervasive and creative participation by
the government in the criminal activity." Spivey, 508 F.2d at 151.
85. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 858. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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reasonable suspicion is not a prerequisite to undercover activities. 86
Although the government agents obtained false documents, lied to
prosecutors and judges, submitted false claims to the insurance compa-
nies, and lied to the insurance agents, 8 7 this web of deceit did not in-
duce the defendant to commit the fraud, the court asserted. Following
the reasoning of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Archer H,88 the
court determined that because none of these outrageous acts of the gov-
ernment was perpetrated against Dr. Gamble, he could not claim a due
process violation in this area of the government's conduct. 89
The area of governmental conduct that did directly affect the de-
fendant, although deceitful, was not sufficient to violate due process, the
court stated. Dr. Gamble is a black doctor who practiced in the Kansas
City ghetto area. The agents presented themselves as poor and needing
financial help. The court conceded that the circumstances were "ap-
pealing" to the doctor who "might [have] appear[ed] callous if he did
not cooperate." 90 Although finding that the government created and
controlled the crime in which the defendant joined, the court concluded
that insurance fraud represents a legitimate target for police undercover
activity. 9 i
Finally, the court discussed the government's conduct and Dr. Gam-
ble's subsequent conviction in conjunction with its supervisory power.
The court concluded that it was foreclosed from exercising its power
because "we may not fashion a 'sub-constitutional' rule to permit dis-
missal of this case because of the government agents' conduct. "92
III. ANALYSIS
United States v. Gamble presented the Tenth Circuit with a clear case
of government-manufactured crime entered into for the purpose of con-
victing offenders. The government violated at least five state statutes
and lied to prosecutors, judges and insurance companies (which were
the purported beneficiaries of the scheme) in order to secure convic-
tions of randomly targeted individuals. 93 The government conceived,
86. Id. at 859-60.
87. Id. at 858-59. The court was clearly outraged at this conduct: "The government
agents in the case before us displayed shocking disregard for the legal system." Id. at 859.
88. 646 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851 (1981).
89. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 859.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 860.
92. Id., citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) for the proposition that
even when an investigation is "tainted with gross illegalities," a court may not dismiss a
prosecution of its own accord when the defendant does not have standing to object to the
agents' conduct. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
93. In the Appellant's Brief for Warren, 747 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1984), which con-
cerned the same scheme as that in Gamble, the defendant listed five Missouri state statutes
violated in the undercover operation: Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 302.220 (prohibited uses of
licenses); 570.090 (forgery; class C felony); 575.060 (false declarations; class B misde-
meanor); 575.080 (false reports; class B misdemeanor); 575.00 (tampering with physical
evidence; class A misdemeanor); 575.110 (tampering with public record; class A misde-
meanor) (Vernon 1979). Appellant's Brief at 7-13.
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created and directed the operation from start to finish. Gamble is thus
indistinguishable from Twigg.94 And, like Twigg, the defendant in Gamble
was merely an auxiliary, the last element needed to complete the con-
trived crime. Yet, unlike Twigg, the due process defense in Gamble was
unsuccessful.
The court cited extensively from Twigg and Greene, apparently with
approval, noting that those cases stand for the proposition that the gov-
ernment may not instigate, manufacture, nor become enmeshed in
crime from beginning to end for the purpose of securing convictions of
individuals who were " 'minding [their] own affairs.' -95 The court also
noted that the due process defense survives because of the Hampton con-
curring and dissenting opinions which deemed fundamental fairness
would prevent conviction of a predisposed defendant (and, a fortiori, a
nonpredisposed defendant) under certain circumstances. 9 6
Despite these references, the Tenth Circuit failed to draw the obvi-
ous parallel. 9 7 It reiterated its holding in United States v. Spivey9 8 which
formulated the test used by the Tenth Circuit to determine due process
violations:
[T]o be relevant at all, the government's conduct must be pos-
tured as connected in some way to the commission of the acts
for which the defendant stands convicted. In cases decided
since Russell ...this connection has been implicitly acknowl-
edged by reference to the extent to which the government insti-
gated, participated in, or was involved or enmeshed in, the
criminal activity itself. Thus, the more immediate the impact of
the government's conduct upon the particular defendant, the
more vigorously would be applied Russell's test for constitu-
tional impropriety.9 9
Spivey's defense failed because of his own independent illegal conduct
and the fact that in that case the government neither initiated contact
94. In Twigg, the court stated that "[ilt is unclear whether the parties had the means or
the money to obtain the chemical [which the government supplied] on their own." Twigg,
588 F.2d at 380. The court also determined that the defendants lacked the expertise to
manufacture the drug. Id. at 381. In Gamble, no such "expertise" was required due to the
nature of the crime but, like Twigg, "[t]he assistance . . .provided [by the defendant] was
minimal and then at the specific direction of [the government]." Id.
95. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 858 (quoting United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 381 (3d
Cir. 1978)).
96. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 856-57 (citing Hampton, 425 U.S. at 492 (Powell, J., concur-
ring), 497 (Brennan, j., dissenting)). See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
97. In United States v. Warren, 747 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1984), the court stated that
Greene and Twigg "involved facts readily distinguishable from the present case." Warren,
747 F.2d at 1343. The court did not make this claim in Gamble, and it is difficult to see how
Gamble and Warren differ from Twigg. The difference between Gamble and Warren is that in
Warren the defendant was an active, profiting participant in the scheme. See Warren, 747
F.2d at 1341 n.3 (four agents, over a period of months, visited defendant's office 34 times;
the insurance company was billed for 100 visits at a total charge (calculated by the defend-
ant) of $3,625).
98. 508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975). See supra note 84.
99. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 858 (quoting Spivey, 508 F.2d at 149-50). The Russell test is
that expressed by Justice Rehnquist which referred to Rochin. See supra text accompanying
note 33.
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nor instigated the drug sales.' 00 In Gamble, the government both initi-
ated contact and instigated the scheme. By the court's own characteriza-
tion, "[t]he government . . . enmeshed in criminal schemes fabricated
entirely by government agents a black doctor who had no criminal rec-
ord and with respect to whom the agents had no apparent hint of a pre-
disposition to criminal activity."' 0 '
The court avoided the consequences of its own determination that
the due process defense is properly invoked when " 'the government's
conduct [is] ... connected in some way to the commission of the acts for
which the defendant stands convicted' "o102 by dividing its analysis into
discrete parts: the crime of mail fraud, the government's unlawful activi-
ties prior to inducement, and the government's actions as they directly
affected Dr. Gamble. These elements should not be separated because
to do so prevents a complete examination of the government's creation
and instigation of the scheme and its level of involvement therein. This
examination is the very heart of the due process defense. Nor can the
causal connection between the government's inducement and the de-
fendant's commission of the crime be fairly examined if these factors are
viewed in isolation. The Gamble court did not view the government's
conduct as a whole and did not consider justice Powell's comments in
Hampton that noncontraband offenses may engender different criteria
for due process analysis, with the focus on the tactics used in light of the
circumstances involved.' 0 3 The Gamble court merely concluded that it
did not find insurance fraud so "commonplace that it is improper for the
government to try to catch and convict citizens who engage in it."i
1
04
Drug-related crimes and corruption in public offices involve issues and
societal effects which are demonstrably different from those of small-
scale insurance fraud. This is not to say that the latter should be con-
doned. It should not. But when that crime, which by its very nature
necessitates random targeting, becomes the subject of an intricate and
intrusive undercover operation, such as that in Gamble, the issue turns
not merely on whether the crime is a proper target for undercover oper-
ations but also on whether greater societal interests are at stake.
Because the Gamble court apparently determined that the defendant
was not predisposed and that the government instigated the crime, 10 5
100. Spivey, 508 F.2d at 150, 151. See supra note 84; see also United States v. Szycher,
585 F.2d 443, 446-49 (10th Cir. 1978) (defendant attended party given by informant and
DEA agents, invited them to his home for some cocaine, and agents subsequently ex-
pressed their desire to purchase the drug in quantity; court adopted trial court's determi-
nation that this constituted mere opportunity for commission of crime because of the
defendant's predisposition).
101. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 859. In both Russell and Hampton the defendants were predis-
posed. See supra section I(B).
102. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 858 (quoting Spivey, 508 F.2d at 149).
103. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 493 (Powell,J., concurring). See also supra text accompanying
notes 44-45.
104. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 860 (emphasis added). "[T]o catch" implies a defendant al-
ready engaged in the activity. Given the facts of Gamble, the proper phrasing would be "to
induce."
105. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87, 91.
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the court should have examined the following interdependent factors for
its due process analysis: (1) whether the government manufactured
crime for the sole purpose of obtaining a conviction;' 0 6 (2) the nature of
the crime involved;' 0 7 and (3) whether the defendant acted "in concert"
with the government in committing the crime for which he was
convicted. ' 08
By failing to evaluate Dr. Gamble's due process claim in this man-
ner, the Tenth Circuit ignores the anomoly of convicting a defendant
who had far less participation in a crime than did the government.' 0 9 It
also ignores the implications of police undercover work which focuses
on anticipating rather than investigating crime; that is, undercover work
which amounts to random integrity testing.' 10 If the issue is outrageous
police conduct, then that conduct must be assessed in light of all circum-
stances involved - including the detection practices employed to in-
duce the defendant's commission of the crime. I1 ' The Gamble court
only found "outrageous" the government's "shocking disregard for the
106. See supra text accompanying note 83; see also supra text accompanying notes 54-56
for the Twigg court's assessment of government-created crimes.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45. Relevant to this inquiry is the difficulty
of detection, see Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring) and United States v.
Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1980), society's need to deter and detect such crime,
and a balancing of the interests involved. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04; see also
United States v. Archer (Archer 1) 486 F.2d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting the danger in
assigning "too little [weight] to the rights of citizens to be free from government-induced
criminality") (dictum); Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the Staged Arrest, 66
MINN. L. REV. 567, 613 (1982) (arguing that random targeting amounts to "intrusive and
deceptive undercover weaponry to test the integrity or criminal propensities of citizens at
large").
108. See supra note 48. Related to this analysis, and a factor not addressed by the Gam-
ble court, is an evaluation of the elements of the crime itself, see supra text accompanying
note 77. In Gamble, the government provided both of the elements required. Although
this fact does not prevent conviction, see supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text, the
court's separation of this issue from the due process claim is myopic. The court states that
"[tihe government's actions in formulating the scheme and drawing defendant into it are
not to be condemned as failing to satisfy the 'scheme' element." Gamble, 737 F.2d at 856.
Yet such conduct must be evaluated in view of the "in concert" requirement of Hampton.
Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489-90. If "in concert" means anything, it must require that the
defendant be "an active participant in an illegal .. .enterprise." Russell, 411 U.S. at 436
(emphasis added). See United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 387 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982) (no due process violation when defendant initiated contact
with DEA agent and was thus found to be "a predisposed active participant [in the scheme],
motivated solely by a desire to make money") (emphasis by the court); cf. supra note 97.
109. See supra notes 93 and 107 and accompanying text.
110. See generally Marx, Who Really Gets Stung? Some Issues Raised by the New Police Under-
cover Work, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 165, 175 (1982) (noting "[t]he government's unregulated
power to carry out integrity tests at will ..."); Comment, supra note 51, at 1471 ("[It] is
difficult to square arbitrary and unrestrained solicitation of crime with the requirement of
fundamental fairness inherent in due process.").
111. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text; Marx, supra note 110, at 167 ("At a
very general level, there appears [in law enforcement practices] to be a decline in the
acceptance of coercive means to control people, with a concomitant rise in deceptive
means."); Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement: Lewis v. United States
and Beyond, 4 Hous. L. REV. 609, 611 (1967) ("To the extent that the propriety of a prac-
tice is raised by a defendant on appeal .. .the inquiry is limited to the specific detection
practice in question.... Without 'total' thinking about detection, however, society fails to
identify and articulate detection 'values' for its detection system.").
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legal system.' ,12 But the government's quiet invasion into the homes
and offices of its citizens to test their propensity for crime manifests a
more insidious, although less dramatic, encroachment on personal liber-
ties than did Rochin.' i These tactics are outrageous.
Jill BurIram
112. Gamble, 737 F.2d at 859.
113. See also Mascolo, snpra note 46, at 29 ("The degree of [policel misconduct
which will warrant the barring of prosecution, should not be restricted to situations involv-
ing police brutality that rivals 'the rack and the screw' in its assault upon human dignity.")
(quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)); Comment, Entrapment, Do Lorean
and the Undercover Operation: .4 Constitutional Connection, 18 J. MAR. L. REV. 365. 397 (1985)
(arguing that "the individual's privacy interests, ["the citizen's 'right to be let alone' ",
become a necessary consideration in cases of entrapment and outrageous government
misconduct") (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,].,
dissenting)).
In another context, in Poe v. Ullman, but expressing similar sentiments, Justice
Harlan declared:
The secular state is not an examiner of consciences: it must operate in the realm
of behavior, of overt actions, and where it does so operate. not only the underly-
ing, moral purpose of its operations, but also the choice of means becomes relevant
to anv Constitutional judgment on what is done.
367 U.S. 497, 547 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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